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441 
READING DEBOER AND OBERGEFELL 
THROUGH THE “MORAL READINGS 
VERSUS ORIGINALISMS” DEBATE: FROM 
CONSTITUTIONAL “EMPTY CUPBOARDS” 
TO EVOLVING UNDERSTANDINGS 
FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION. By 
James E. Fleming.1 New York: Oxford University Press. 
2015. Pp. xv + 243. $75.00 (cloth). 
Linda C. McClain2 
Original meaning. . . . When two individuals sign a contract to 
sell a house, no one thinks that, years down the road, one party 
to the contract may change the terms of the deal. That is why 
the parties put the agreement in writing and signed it publicly 
– to prevent changed perceptions and needs from changing the 
guarantees in the agreement. So it normally goes with the 
Constitution: The written charter cements the limitations on 
government into an unbending bulwark, not a vane alterable 
whenever alterations occur – unless and until the people, like 
contracting parties, choose to change the contract through the 
agreed-upon mechanisms for doing so [Article V]. 
. . . Applied here, this approach permits today’s marriage laws 
to stand until the democratic processes say they should stand 
 
 1. Professor of Law and The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in 
Law, Boston University School of Law. 
 2. Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University 
School of Law; Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Faculty Fellow, University Center for 
Human Values, Princeton University. This essay is a revised version of a paper prepared 
for the conference, “Law and Constitutional Interpretation: Moral Readings versus 
Originalisms,” held at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico (UNAM) on February 
16-17, 2015, in Mexico City. My thanks to Imer Flores for inviting me to participate in that 
conference and to participants for helpful comments. The analysis in Part III draws upon 
my portion of the Constitution Day Lecture that James E. Fleming and I delivered at 
University of Missouri (Columbia) on September 17, 2015. My research assistants Gina 
Del Rio Gazzo and Samantha Maurer provided valuable help on this project. Thanks also 
to James Fleming for comments. A Boston University summer research grant supported 
this project. 
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no more. From the founding of the Republic to 2003, every 
State defined marriage as a relationship between a man and a 
woman, meaning that the Fourteenth Amendment permits, 
though it does not require, States to define marriage in that 
way. 
—DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403-04 (6th Cir. 2014) (Sutton, 
Jeffrey, Circuit Judge) 
The majority’s “original meaning” analysis . . . can tell us little 
about the Fourteenth Amendment, except to assure us that 
“the people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment [never] 
understood it to require the States to change the definition of 
marriage.” The quick answer is that they undoubtedly did not 
understand that it would also require school desegregation in 
1955 or the end of miscegenation laws across the country, 
beginning in California in 1948 and culminating in the Loving 
decision in 1967 . . . . 
Moreover, . . . [t]here is not now and never has been a 
universally accepted definition of marriage. . . When Justice 
Alito noted in Windsor that the opponents of DOMA were 
“implicitly ask[ing] us to endorse [a more expansive definition 
of marriage and] to reject the traditional view, Windsor, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2718 (Alito, J., dissenting), he may have been unfamiliar 
with all that the “traditional view” entailed, especially for 
women who were subjected to coverture as a result of Anglo-
American common law. Fourteenth Amendment cases decided 
by the Supreme Court in the years since 1971 that 
“invalidat[ed] various laws and policies that categorized by sex 
have been part of a transformation that has altered the very 
institution at the heart of this case, marriage.” Latta [v. Otter], 
771 F.3d 456, 487 [9th Cir. 2014] (Berzon, J., concurring). 
—DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d at 431-32 (Daughtrey, Martha Craig, 
Circuit Judge, dissenting) 
History really matters in Obergefell v. Hodges . . . History, like 
the Constitution, can be read in more than one way. 
—Nancy F. Cott, Which History in Obergefell v. Hodges?, 
PERSPECTIVES ON HISTORY (July 2015) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What’s in a name? Why do labels such as “moral reader” or 
“originalist” matter? The title of the conference that generated 
this published symposium suggests one context in which such 
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labels matter: constitutional interpretation.3 We must consider the 
merits, it implies, of two approaches in evident tension with each 
other: “moral readings versus originalisms.” As the judicial 
statements quoted above indicate, this interpretive choice 
mattered for a practical and momentous constitutional 
controversy that recently riveted the attention of scholars, judges, 
legislators, and the public: what would the United States Supreme 
Court do when it considered DeBoer v. Snyder,4 the Sixth Circuit 
case in which Judge Sutton’s majority opinion created a circuit 
split—disagreeing with the Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits—by upholding statutes and constitutional amendments 
in four states (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee) that 
excluded same-sex couples from civil marriage and barred 
recognition of their valid out-of-state marriages. On January 16, 
2015, the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari in that 
case. Amicus curiae (friends of the court) filed a record number 
(147) of amicus curiae briefs in the case,5 proffering many 
different constitutional pathways to reversing or affirming the 
Sixth Circuit. On June 26, 2015, in Obergerfell v. Hodges, the 
Court did reverse, issuing its landmark holding that “same-sex 
couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry” and that 
the state laws at issue were invalid “to the extent they exclude 
same-sex couples from civil marriage on the same terms and 
conditions as opposite-sex couples.”6 
As historian Nancy Cott observed, “history really 
matter[ed]” in Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority opinion, 
specifically, the history of the institution of marriage and how it 
has “changed over time to admit new understandings of liberty 
and equality” as well as “the history of condemnation and 
 
 3. The conference, held at Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México on February 
16-17, 2015, was entitled “Law and Constitutional Interpretation: Moral Readings versus 
Originalisms.” 
 4. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (reversing lower federal court 
rulings that the state statutes and constitutional amendments in Michigan, Kentucky, Ohio, 
and Tennessee violated the Due Process and/or Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). DeBoer was overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015). 
 5. Adam Liptak, Want to Be the Court’s Friend? It’s a Lot of Work, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 8, 2016, at A18 (reporting on statistics kept by Anthony J. Franze and R. Reeves 
Anderson, lawyers at Arnold & Porter). The party and amicus briefs are available at 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/obergefell-v-hodges/. 
 6. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605. 
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criminalization of same-sex intimacy until recent decades.”7 
History also mattered in the various dissenting opinions, for, as 
Cott observed, “more than one version of the history of marriage 
[was] operating.”8 Chief Justice Roberts asserted that marriage is 
an “‘unvarying social institution’”9 and invoked the “singular 
understanding of marriage [that] has prevailed in the United 
States throughout our history.”10 Dissenting Justice Scalia insisted 
that “the People’s understanding”—“when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified in 1868”—that states did and could 
(constitutionally) limit marriage to one man and one woman 
“resolves these cases.”11 
In this essay, I will argue that Justice Kennedy’s landmark 
majority opinion in Obergefell crucially deployed two forms of 
evolving understanding—of constitutional guarantees of equality 
and the “promise of liberty” as well as of the institution of 
marriage. Those two forms of evolution worked together in his 
opinion to reject a static notion either of the fundamental right to 
marry or of marriage itself. This approach to constitutional 
reasoning exemplifies the “moral reading” approach articulated 
in James E. Fleming’s recent book, Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution: For Moral Readings and Against Originalism. As 
Fleming explains: “Moral readers accept our responsibility not to 
retreat from interpreting the Constitution so as to fulfill the 
promise of our commitments to abstract aspirational principles 
such as liberty and equality—not to retreat to originalism” (p. 
191). Such an approach, evident in Justice Kennedy’s prior 
landmark LGBT rights decisions, such as Lawrence v. Texas,12 
stresses the role of “insight” and of generational progress in 
coming to see “that laws once thought necessary and proper in 
fact serve only to oppress.”13 In Obergefell, as elaborated below, 
two such examples concern the repudiation of the laws of 
coverture and sex-based classifications perpetuating gender 
 
 7. Nancy F. Cott, Which History in Obergefell v. Hodges?, PERSPECTIVES ON 
HISTORY (Summer 2015), https://www.historians.org/publications-and-directories/persp
ectives-on-history/summer-2015/which-history-in-obergefell-v-hodges (describing role 
played in majority opinion by friends of the court briefs filed by historians). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2622 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 10. Id. at 2613. 
 11. Id. at 2627 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 13. Id. at 578–79 (quoted by Fleming at pp. 59, 191).  
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hierarchy within marriage and of laws barring interracial 
marriage. 
Previewing the interpretive battle between the Obergefell 
majority and the dissents (but with the sides reversed), in DeBoer 
v. Snyder Judge Sutton (writing the majority opinion) and Judge 
Daughtrey (in dissent) took sharply contrasting views of the 
relevance of “original meaning” with respect to the definition of 
marriage and the Fourteenth Amendment. These two judges’ 
contrasting approaches to marriage—whether universal and 
(until recently) unchanging or evolving in light of constitutional 
norms of equality—are of particular interest for the evident 
conflict between moral readings and originalisms. Judge Sutton’s 
analysis of “original meaning,” for example, drew critiques by 
some legal scholars, who contended that there were originalist 
arguments for same-sex marriage, such as a “principles-based 
originalism” that “leaves room for the possibility that we may 
learn from experience and systematic study that laws once 
thought necessary and proper serve only to needlessly oppress.”14 
Indeed, two groups of prominent legal scholars filed amicus briefs 
in Obergefell enlisting the “original meaning” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to oppose the restrictive marriage laws at issue,15 
spurring other originalist scholars to file an amicus brief 
contesting this approach to defining “original meaning” as 
pushing the term “originalist” so far that it “ceases to have any 
real meaning at all.”16 
Fleming’s book went to press prior to Obergefell, but he 
noted the rise of “new” or “inclusive” originalist arguments for 
same-sex marriage, some growing out of new originalist 
 
 14. Dale Carpenter, Inverted Equal Protection: Same-Sex Marriage at the Sixth 
Circuit (Part 1, Originalism), THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Nov. 14, 2014) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/11/14/inverted-equal-
protection-same-sex-marriage-at-the-sixth-circuit-part-I/.  
 15. Brief of Amici Curiae Cato Inst., William N. Eskridge Jr., and Steven Calabresi 
in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, 
-571, -574) [hereinafter Cato Institute Brief]; Brief Amicus Curiae of Legal Scholars 
Stephen Clark, Andrew Koppelman, Sanford Levinson, Irina Manta, Erin Shelley and Ilya 
Somin, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, -571, -574) 
[hereinafter Legal Scholars Brief]. 
 16. Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Originalism in Support of Respondents at 16, 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14–556, -562, -571, -574) [hereinafter 
Scholars of Originalism Brief].  
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justification for the Court’s sex equality precedents (pp. 16-19).17 
He argued, however, that by “conceiving the relevant original 
meaning abstractly, rather than specifically,” and by making 
arguments “about the evolving meaning” of commitment to 
“abstract evolving principles,” such originalists “are engaging in 
moral readings,” but without acknowledging that they are doing 
so (pp. 18-19). This is a persuasive point, and at least some 
originalists would agree.18 Perhaps these new originalists should 
join the moral reading big tent (as Fleming proposes (p. 96)), 
rather than recruit others to a new, “inclusive” originalist big 
tent.19 My primary interest in this essay, however, is not to 
adjudicate whether the new originalism is a defensible form of 
originalism, but instead to examine the respective roles of moral 
readings and originalism in DeBoer and then Obergefell. It is 
telling that (1) none of the conservative Justices—all of whom 
dissented—embraced the new originalism in Obergefell, and that 
(2) although “meaning” and “understanding” feature centrally in 
Kennedy’s majority opinion, they have less to do with fixed or 
“original” meaning or understanding than with evolving meaning 
and new understandings of constitutional guarantees and 
principles. An analysis of Obergefell (and, more broadly, the 
recent marriage equality litigation leading up to it) suggests that 
moral readings of the Constitution have played a significant role 
in making it less of (in Justice Ginsburg’s words) an “empty 
cupboard” for gay men and lesbians, just as they have played a 
role in making it less empty in the context of sex equality claims.20 
As the Court’s gender revolution in interpreting Equal Protection 
was unfolding, Ginsburg (then a pioneering litigator and scholar) 
insisted that: “Boldly dynamic interpretation, departing radically 
from the original understanding, is required to tie to the 
fourteenth amendment’s equal protection clause a command that 
government treat men and women as individuals equal in rights, 
 
 17. See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 
2383 n. 192 (2015) (noting that “many originalists did suggest that there were plausible 
originalist arguments in favor of the claimants’ position” in Obergefell and listing 
examples).  
 18. See, e.g., Scholars of Originalism Brief, supra note 16, at 15–16 and discussion 
infra Part III. 
 19. Baude articulates an “inclusive originalism” and further contends that it is “our 
law,” in terms of current constitutional practices. See Baude, supra note 17. For Fleming’s 
critique of Baude, see pp. 15-19.  
 20. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the Fourteenth and Equal Rights 
Amendments, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 161, 164. 
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responsibilities, and opportunities.”21 Not surprisingly, in light of 
the long history of “empty-cupboard” jurisprudence and, for 
much of U.S. history, the absence of sex equality from the 
“constitutional canon,”22 feminist scholars are generally not 
among the ranks of originalists.23 Nonetheless, even if the 
interpretive and historical projects in which new originalists are 
engaging may strain the label of “originalism,” and may be better 
cast as forms of a moral reading of the Constitution, they are 
valuable in encouraging critical reflection upon how and why sex 
discrimination and sexual orientation discrimination were part of 
the historical practices in the United States but are now 
recognizably inconsistent with our constitutional commitments 
and aspirational principles. 
In Part II, I analyze the majority and dissenting opinions in 
DeBoer, focusing on their competing approaches to the relevance 
of “original meaning” of the Fourteenth Amendment and to the 
definition and history of marriage. I argue that the dissent offers 
a more persuasive approach, in stressing the transformation of 
marriage and gradual elimination of discriminatory marriage 
laws. In characterizing this as a moral reading, I also highlight the 
role that a moral reading played in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health,24 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts’ 
pathbreaking opinion interpreting the Massachusetts constitution 
to require extending civil marriage to same-sex couples, which (as 
I elaborate in Part III) serves as a template for Obergefell. Part III 
first discusses new originalist arguments made in amicus briefs 
urging reversal of the Sixth Circuit, and counterarguments made 
 
 21. Id. at 161. Some newer strands of originalism challenge Ginsburg’s argument by 
advancing an account of “fidelity to the original public meaning” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, under which reading that amendment’s “anti-caste principle” in light of the 
Nineteenth Amendment leads “inexorably to the conclusion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits sex discrimination.” See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, 
Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 46 (2011) (drawing on Reva Siegel, 
She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002)). 
 22. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Women’s Exclusion from the Constitutional Canon, 2013 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1715. 
 23. Notably, Mary Anne Case, who propounds a “feminist fundamentalism” theory 
of constitutional interpretation, reports that she had not given much thought to originalism 
until she “accepted the invitation from the Federalist Society to appear as the only woman 
with a speaking part” in their national symposium, Originalism 2.0. Mary Anne Case, The 
Ladies? Forget About Them. A Feminist Perspective on the Limits of Originalism, 29 
CONST. COMM. 431 (2014). 
 24. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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in briefs challenging such use of originalism. I then observe the 
evident rejection of such new originalist approaches in the four 
dissents in Obergefell, which instead appealed to original meaning 
and understanding to conclude that state marriage laws survived 
challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. I argue that Justice 
Kennedy, writing for the majority, is best understood as offering 
a moral reading of the Constitution. Twin forms of evolution – of 
understanding constitutional guarantees and of the institution of 
marriage – animate his opinion. I argue that the similar treatment 
of those twin forms of evolution in Goodridge provided a 
template for Kennedy’s opinion, as well as for his rejection of a 
narrow originalism that focuses on historical practices or original 
intent. History, for Kennedy (aided by friends of the court briefs 
filed by historians), was the beginning but not the end of the 
matter. In Part IV, I conclude. 
II. DEBOER V. SNYDER: “ORIGINAL MEANING” OR 
TRANSFORMATION OF “TRADITION”? 
In his majority opinion in DeBoer v. Snyder, Judge Sutton 
begins and ends with propositions about how “change” should 
occur “under the United States Constitution,” contending that 
changing the definition of marriage to include same-sex couples 
should be left to “state democratic processes” rather than to 
federal judges.25 I focus here on how forms of originalism shape 
Sutton’s opinion, contrasting it with the dissenting Judge 
Daughtrey’s emphatic rejection of such originalism. 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION: “ORIGINAL MEANING” FORBIDS 
A CONSTRUCTION ZONE 
“Original meaning” features in the majority’s approach both 
to interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment and to affirming the 
“traditional definition of marriage.” Subsequently, as discussed in 
Part III, some of the Obergefell dissents would embrace similar 
approaches. As is evident in the passage quoted at the beginning 
of this essay, Judge Sutton contends that the original meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment was laid down at its ratification. Far 
from there being (to use terms in Fleming’s book) a “construction 
zone” or any appropriate “building out” of constitutional 
 
 25. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2014); see id. at 420 (“This case 
ultimately presents two ways to think about change.”). 
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principles such as liberty or equality (pp. 33, 139-40), the 
“originally understood meaning” is instead an “unbending 
bulwark;” indeed, the “written charter cements” limits on 
government.26 It is not a weather “vane,” “alterable whenever 
alterations occur.”27 In other words, by contrast to certain forms 
of new originalism, there should be no “updating” in interpreting 
or applying “fixed” constitutional provisions (or principles) in 
light of new facts or changing social understandings.28 
Sutton acknowledges that the “line between interpretation 
and evolution” in determining the “original meaning” of a 
constitutional provision “blurs from time to time”; after all, “the 
Fourteenth Amendment is old; the people ratified it in 1868,” and 
“it is generally worded.”29 Nonetheless: “Nobody in this case . . . 
argues that the people who adopted the Fourteenth Amendment 
understood it to require the States to change the definition of 
marriage.”30 Instead, Sutton continues by appealing to 
“tradition,” noting the continuity in the definition of marriage in 
the states “[f]rom the founding of the Republic to 2003”31 (the 
year of Goodridge). Consistent with this static view of traditional 
marriage, it is Washington v. Glucksberg that Sutton enlists in 
support of “the import of original meaning in legal debates.”32 
Strikingly absent here, as the dissent points out, is any attention 
to the tension between original meaning and the role of the 
Fourteenth Amendment in the subsequent transformation of 
certain features of marriage present in 1868 – such as coverture 
and antimiscegenation laws. 
The majority opinion sounds a theme familiar both from 
state and federal constitutional litigation over marriage equality 
and from legislative arguments in favor of constitutional 
 
 26. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403. 
 27. Id. 
 28. By contrast to Judge Sutton, for example, Ilya Somin, who advances a sex 
discrimination argument for marriage equality, argues that originalist methodology is 
“entirely consistent with updating the application of [the Fourteenth Amendment’s] fixed 
principles in light of new factual information,” and such updating is “not only permitted 
but actually required by the theory.” Ilya Somin, William Eskridge on Originalism and 
Same-Sex Marriage, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 23, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/01/23/william-
eskridge-on-originalism-and-same-sex-marriage/. 
 29. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 403. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 404. 
 32. Id. at 403 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710–19 (1997)). 
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amendments: until 2004, when due to Goodridge, marriage 
became available to same-sex couples in Massachusetts, marriage 
had a fixed and shared meaning. Not only does that meaning of 
marriage as “between a man and a woman” date back to “the 
founding,”33 Judge Sutton argues, it dates back “thousands of 
years.”34 Accepting as a rational basis for state marriage bans that 
states “might wish to wait and see before changing a norm that 
our society (like all others) has accepted for centuries,” he 
contrasts the comparatively shorter time line of the experiment 
with same-sex marriage: 
The fair question is whether in 2004, one year after Goodridge, 
Michigan voters could stand by the traditional definition of 
marriage. How can we say that the voters acted irrationally for 
sticking with the seen benefits of thousands of years of 
adherence to the traditional definition of marriage in the face 
of one year of experience with a new definition of marriage. . . 
. A Burkean sense of caution does not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment, least of all when measured by a timeline less than 
a dozen years long . . . .35 
Sutton asserts: “A dose of humility makes us hesitant to 
condemn as unconstitutionally irrational a view of marriage 
shared not long ago by every society in the world, shared by most, 
if not all, of our ancestors, and shared still today by a significant 
number of the States.”36 
That view of marriage is, in effect, the by-now familiar 
“responsible procreation” or channelling argument offered as a 
rational basis for state marriage definitions that exclude same-sex 
couples. Although, in post-Windsor constitutional litigation, the 
other four circuit courts had rejected the responsible procreation 
argument, as does Judge Daughtrey in her dissent, Judge Sutton 
concludes it is one possible rational basis for the state laws under 
challenge. State marriage laws make sense, he asserts, if one starts 
with the premise that “governments got into . . . and remain in the 
business of defining marriage, not to regulate love but to regulate 
sex, most especially the intended and unintended effects of male-
female intercourse,” and to ensure parental investment in and 
commitment to “the natural effects of male-female intercourse: 
 
 33. Id. at 404. 
 34. Id. at 406. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 404.  
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children.”37 Notably, he finds that “[i]t is not society’s laws or . . . 
any one religion’s laws, but nature’s laws (that men and women 
complement each other biologically), that created the policy 
imperative” for marriage and, thus, “governments typically are 
not second-guessed under the Constitution for prioritizing how 
they tackle such issues.”38 
Sutton’s account of the familiar “channelling” argument 
about the origins of marriage appeals to history and nature, 
specifically, to assumed factual premises about the two sexes and 
gender complementarity. On this account, the state may rationally 
restrict marriage only to heterosexuals because only they may 
accidentally or unintentionally procreate and, thus, they 
particularly need the inducement of the many benefits linked to 
marriage to anchor their commitment to the children their sexual 
relations may produce. In contemporary marriage equality 
litigation, an early articulation of this channelling argument 
featured in Justice Cordy’s dissent in Goodridge v. Department of 
Public Health.39 It also features in Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent 
in Obergefell (as discussed in Part III, below). Cordy advances, as 
I elaborate in other work, a conception of marriage as a social 
institution designed to solve a problem presented by nature, or 
evolution.40 Cordy drew on James Q. Wilson’s The Marriage 
Problem (also cited by Roberts), which identified that 
evolutionary problem as the sexual and reproductive asymmetry 
of men and women in the state of nature and the need for a 
mechanism to anchor men to women and to children.41 Even on 
the terms of this single purpose, a historical account of marriage, 
Judge Sutton fails to explain the logic of how excluding same-sex 
couples from marriage advances state purposes.42 
 
 37. Id.  
 38. Id. at 405. 
 39. 798 N.E.2d 941, 983, 995–96 (Cordy, J, dissenting). 
 40. I have written about the channelling function and its role in marriage equality 
litigation in Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the 
Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133 (2007). 
 41. 798 N.E.2d at 995-96 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM 23-
32 (2002)); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2613 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) 
(citing Wilson). For analysis of Wilson and the role his work has played in marriage 
equality litigation, see Linda C. McClain, James Q. Wilsons’s–and Society’s–Marriage 
Problem, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2511229. 
 42. My aim here is not to criticize this argument, which, as I point out infra, 
Daughtrey does effectively, enlisting Judge Posner’s trenchant critique in Baskin v. Bogan.  
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Finally, the majority opinion’s reliance on some form of 
originalism and rejection of a moral reading is also evident in its 
emphatic rejection of what it calls an “evolving meaning” 
approach to constitutional interpretation, which it understands to 
entail looking at “evolving moral and policy considerations.”43 
Quoting the landmark sex equality case, United States v. Virginia, 
Judge Sutton acknowledges a conception of constitutional 
interpretation that moves toward better realization of aspirational 
principles: “‘A prime part of the history of our Constitution . . . is 
the story of the extension of constitutional rights . . . to people 
once ignored or excluded.’”44 He observes that the Court has 
looked to “evolving moral and policy considerations before,” so 
“Why not do so here?”45 His answer is a curious account of 
constitutional evolution and “living constitutionalism.” To wit: “a 
principled jurisprudence of constitutional evolution turns on 
evolution in society’s values, not evolution in judges’ values”;46 
while “every generation has the right to govern itself,” this means 
that until society has “ moved past” certain principles, judges must 
not “anticipat[e] principles that society has yet to embrace.”47 This 
conception of “living constitutionalism” entails that courts should 
not get ahead of “democratic majorities,” who should be given 
judicial deference in “deciding within reasonable bounds when 
and whether to embrace an evolving, as opposed to settled, 
societal norm.”48 The court distinguishes Lawrence, where only a 
minority of states still had anti-sodomy laws, from the instant case, 
in which over thirty states would still bar same-sex marriage but 
for “federal-court intervention.”49 Rather than seeking 
vindication through “creation of a new constitutional right” as a 
way to remedy the “loss of . . . dignity and respect,” plaintiffs, 
Judge Sutton argues, should turn to the actual source of this loss—
“the neighborhoods and communities in which gay and lesbian 
couples live”;50 and such couples should work to forge a new 
community “consensus” there, thus “earn[ing] victories through 
initiatives and legislation and the greater acceptance that comes 
 
 43. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 416. 
 44. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557 (1996)).  
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 417. 
 49. Id. at 416. 
 50. Id.  
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with them.”51 Urging that persuading a majority of citizens to 
“dignify and respect the rights of minority groups through 
majoritarian laws” is preferable to doing so “through decisions 
issued by a majority of Supreme Court Justices,” the court adds: 
“Rights need not be countermajoritarian to count.”52 Sutton 
closes his opinion by returning to the themes of tradition and 
change: states—free from judicial intervention—must be allowed 
to decide whether to “expand a definition of marriage that until 
recently was universally followed going back to the earliest days 
of human history”;53 citizens will be “heroes of their own stories” 
if they resolve this issue outside of the courts.54 
B. JUDGE DAUGHTREY’S DISSENT: DEBUNKING AN “ORIGINAL 
MEANING” APPROACH TO THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND MARRIAGE 
Judge Sutton’s static conception of marriage contrasts 
strikingly with the picture of marriage recounted in Judge 
Daughtrey’s dissent, which identifies the problems with the 
appeal to “original meaning” as a way of resolving the federal 
constitutional challenge to restrictive state marriage laws. As we 
will see, this dissent has echoes in Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion in Obergefell. As the passage quoted at the beginning of 
this essay indicates, Daughtrey counters Sutton’s appeal to 
“original meaning” and his argument that “the people,” in 1868, 
did not understand the Fourteenth Amendment to “‘require the 
States to change the definition of marriage’” to permit same-sex 
couples to marry with the rejoinder that they also “undoubtedly 
did not understand that it would also require school desegregation 
in 1955 or the end of miscegenation laws across the country, 
beginning in California in 1948 and culminating in the Loving 
decision in 1967.”55 Here Daughtrey stresses the challenge of 
realizing the Constitution’s commitments and stresses the role of 
courts in that realization: even after “a civil war, the end of 
slavery, and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, 
extensive litigation has been necessary to achieve even a modicum 
of constitutional protection from discrimination based on race, 
and it has occurred primarily by judicial decree, not by the 
 
 51. Id. at 417. 
 52. Id. at 418.  
 53. Id. at 421. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id. at 431 (Daughtrey, J., dissenting). 
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democratic election process to which the majority suggests we 
should defer regarding discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.”56 
Daughtrey also challenges Sutton’s picture of a universal 
and—until recently—unchanging definition of marriage: “there is 
not now and never has been a universally accepted definition of 
marriage.”57 For starters, “even today, polygynous marriages 
outnumber monogamous ones.”58 Judge Posner makes this point 
emphatically in Baskin v. Bogan, observing that there is no 
acknowledgment of polygyny when the State of Wisconsin 
appeals to “the wonders of tradition” by referring to “‘thousands 
of years of collective experience’” as establishing “‘traditional 
marriage, between one man and one woman, as optimal for the 
family, society, and civilization.’”59 Daughtrey further observes 
that, in different historical periods and countries, marriage has 
been “about” many things, including religious obligation and 
political and economic arrangements.60 
Historically, marriage was also “about” gender inequality, a 
dimension largely missing from Sutton’s account. Daughtrey 
observes that (as quoted above) when Justice Alito noted in 
Windsor that the opponents of DOMA were “implicitly ask[ing] 
us to endorse [a more expansive definition of marriage and] to 
reject the traditional view,” he “may have been unfamiliar with all 
that the ‘traditional view’ entailed, especially for women who 
were subjected to coverture as a result of Anglo-American 
common law.”61 Elaborating upon marriage’s history as a 
“profoundly unequal institution, one that imposed distinctly 
different rights and obligations on men and women,”62 Daughtrey 
quotes at length from Judge Barbara Berzon’s concurring opinion 
in Latta v. Otter, in which Berzon argued that Idaho and Nevada’s 
“same-sex marriage bans” were unconstitutional because “they 
are classifications on the basis of gender” that do not survive 
intermediate scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.63 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 667 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 60. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 431. 
 61. Id. at 432 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2718 (2013) (Alito, 
J., dissenting)). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 479 (9th Cir. 2014) (Berzon, J., concurring). 
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Daughtrey details the magnitude of this sex inequality within 
marriage to make a point about constitutional transformation and 
the limits of an appeal to “original meaning”: “Fourteenth 
Amendment cases decided by the Supreme Court in the years 
since 1971 that ‘invalidat[ed] various laws and policies that 
categorized by sex have been part of a transformation that has 
altered the very institution at the heart of this case, marriage.’”64 
The significance of 1971, of course, is that Reed v. Reed, decided 
that year, signaled the beginning of the Court’s turning away from 
what Ruth Bader Ginsburg coined the “empty-cupboard 
interpretation of equal protection in relation to sex equality 
claims.”65 The significance of this constitutional transformation 
for purposes of appeals to the “traditional definition of marriage” 
is, as Berzon and Daughtrey argue, that marriage as an institution 
has undergone deep transformation. Daughtrey sums up: “The 
majority’s admiration for ‘traditional marriage’ thus seems 
misplaced, if not naive. The legal status has been through so many 
reforms that the marriage of same-sex couples constitutes merely 
the latest wave in a vast sea of change.”66 
While Sutton, like Cordy, posits an age-old purpose of 
regulating sex as the reason government got into the marriage 
business, Daughtrey and Berzon appeal to historians of the 
family, such as Nancy Cott, who show that the Founders’ political 
theory viewed marriage as a metaphor for consent by the 
governed (the wife freely consented to the husband’s governance 
of the household).67 As these jurists observe, the loss of women’s 
civil capacity and identity was bound up in reciprocal, but 
complementary, gender roles.68 As Cott and Linda Kerber 
elaborate, marriage performed important work because, within 
the family, wives gentled men and taught them manners and 
mothers cultivated virtue in their children.69 Moreover, as 
Hendrik Hartog (another historian cited by Daughtrey and 
 
 64. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 432 (quoting Latta, 771 F.3d at 487 (Berzon, J., concurring)). 
 65. Ginsburg, supra note 20, at 167. 
 66. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 434. 
 67. NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9-
16 (1999). 
 68. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 432-33 (quoting Latta, 771 F.3d at 487 (Berzon, J., 
concurring); COTT, supra note 67; and other sources). 
 69. COTT, supra note 67, at 19–21; see also LINDA KERBER, WOMEN OF THE 
REPUBLIC 199-200 (1980). For further discussion of the family as a seedbed of civic virtue 
(despite sex inequality), see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING 
CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 56-64 (2006).  
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Berzon) elaborates, “the corollary of wife’s obedience was 
husband’s authority.”70 Further, “[i]mplicit in the idea of 
coverture was [an] image . . . of a wife as the possession of her 
husband, as [a] husband’s property.”71 All of this gender work 
going on within the marital household is distinct from the 
“responsible procreation” argument that Sutton and others insist 
has always been the reason to regulate marriage. Certainly, the 
combination of criminal and marital law drew a sharp line 
between licit and illicit sex and between marital and nonmarital 
children. However, as Daughtrey points out, “although sex was 
strongly presumed to be an essential part of marriage, the ability 
to procreate was not.”72 
Daughtrey observes that Cott, an expert witness who 
testified on behalf of the plaintiffs in the trial in DeBoer 
concerning whether there were rational bases for Michigan’s 
restrictive marriage laws, “explained how the concept of marriage 
and the roles of marriage partners have changed over time.”73 One 
example was the erosion of coverture and of “traditional gender-
assigned roles”; another was that “interracial marriages are legal 
now that the antiquated, racist concept of preserving the purity of 
the white race has fallen into its rightful place of dishonor.”74 
Daughtrey also summarizes the holdings and reasoning of the 
four circuit courts that had (by then) struck down state marriage 
laws to show, in effect, the importance of a moral reading. In other 
words, over time, the Nation better realizes the Constitution’s 
abstract commitments to liberty and equality and the aspirational 
principles entailed in those provisions. In Bostic v. Schaefer, for 
example, the Fourth Circuit read Loving to illustrate that “‘the 
right to marry is an expansive liberty interest that may stretch to 
accommodate changing societal norms.’”75 The Fourth Circuit, 
Judge Daughtrey observes, pointed to the “principle” articulated 
by Justice Kennedy in United States v. Windsor—invoking Loving 
in support—that “‘[s]tate laws defining and regulating marriage, 
 
 70. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 149-50 (2000). 
 71. Id. at 137. Daughtrey reproduces a passage from Judge Berzon’s concurrence that 
cites Hartog on a husband’s possessory interest in his wife. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 432–33 
(quoting HARTOG, supra note 70, at 137). 
 72. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 433. 
 73. Id. at 425. 
 74. Id.  
 75. 760 F.3d 352, 376 (4th Cir. 2014). 
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of course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons.’”76 
Loving has been enormously significant in this post-Windsor 
jurisprudence as a vital precedent for the fundamental right to 
marry and for the argument that such a right must not be read 
narrowly, but broadly to include the freedom to marry the person 
of one’s choice (regardless of race or gender).77 
To connect this to the sex discrimination argument for a 
constitutional challenge to the one man-one woman marriage 
definition, the entire edifice of domestic relations law rested on 
gender hierarchy, (subsequently) separate spheres ideology, and 
premises of gender ordering. A combination of state law reform 
and constitutional litigation (including the shift away from the 
“empty-cupboard” interpretation of the Equal Protection clause) 
has dismantled nearly all of that edifice. The one man-one woman 
definition, one may plausibly argue, is a vestige of coverture and 
the “sex-based legal rules once imbedded in the institution” and 
also reflects gender stereotyping because it related to the 
different, complementary roles or offices that husbands and wives 
were to perform as head of the household and obedient and 
dependent feme covert.78 
C. GOODRIDGE AS A TEMPLATE FOR DUAL EVOLUTION AND A 
MORAL READING 
Family law scholars and historians of marriage will find the 
conception of marriage as an evolving institution set out in Judge 
Daughtrey’s dissent, in Judge Berzon’s concurrence, and in other 
judicial opinions far more persuasive as a matter of history than 
Judge Sutton’s (and, subsequently, than the opinions of the 
dissenting justices in Obergefell),79 just as moral readers will find 
 
 76. DeBoer, 773 F.3d at 429 (citing Bostic, 760 F. 3d at 379 (quoting United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691)). 
 77. See, e.g., Bostic, 760 F.3d at 384 (concluding that excluding same-sex couples from 
marriage excludes them “from participating fully in our society, which is precisely the type 
of segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot countenance”); Latta v. Otter, 771 
F.3d 456, 477–78 (9th Cir. 2014) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (citing Loving in rejecting a 
narrow definition of the right to marry that would confine it to those historically allowed 
to exercise it and embracing evolving interpretation of “liberty”). 
 78. See Latta, 771 F.3d at 490 (Berzon, B., J. concurring) (citing Baker v. State, 744 
A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). It is 
beyond the scope of this Essay to discuss the many scholarly sources advancing this 
argument. 
 79. Such scholars have also contributed amicus briefs elaborating that evolution. See 
Cott, supra note 7 (discussing role of such briefs in Obergefell); Amici Curiae Brief of the 
Professors of the History of Marriage, Families, and the Law at 2, Goodridge v. Dept. of 
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it a better account of realization of aspirational principles and 
generational moral progress. If Justice Cordy’s dissent in 
Goodridge provides an early template for a universally 
understood, not fundamentally changing conception of marriage 
(originating in channelling responsible procreation), then a 
template for the conception of marriage as an evolving institution, 
shaped by remedying injustices within it, features in Chief Justice 
Marshall’s majority opinion in Goodridge. This pathbreaking 
opinion also warrants mention for paving the way for Justice 
Kennedy’s Obergefell opinion, particularly in the way it uses 
history. Evolution away from race and sex discrimination in the 
law of marriage is part of this conception. Marshall looks to the 
“long history” in many states, including Massachusetts, during 
which “no lawful marriage was possible between black and white 
Americans,” but observes that “long history” did not prevent, 
first, the California Supreme Court, and, subsequently, the U.S. 
Supreme Court to rule that such laws violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.80 So, too, in the case of the bar on same-sex 
marriage, Marshall argues, “history must yield to a more fully 
developed understanding of the invidious quality of the 
discrimination.”81 
Marshall offers a moral reading, quoting the very passage 
from VMI that Sutton invokes, to different effect: “The history of 
constitutional law ‘is the story of the extension of constitutional 
rights and protections to people once ignored or excluded,’” 
evident in Supreme Court precedents striking down sex and race 
discrimination as contrary to Equal Protection.82 Marshall finds 
that this is as true for “civil marriage” as for other areas of “civil 
rights,” offering the demise of both antimiscegenation law and 
coverture as examples: 
As a public institution and a right of fundamental importance, 
civil marriage is an evolving paradigm. The common law was 
exceptionally harsh toward women who became wives: a 
 
Public Health, 798 N.E.32d 941 (Mass. 2003) (No. SCJ-08860), (arguing that: “allowing 
same-sex couples to participate as full citizens in the institution of marriage is not a radical 
change,” but “the logical next step in this Court’s long tradition of reforming marriage to 
fit the evolving nature of committed intimate relationships and the rights of the individuals 
in those relationships”). The author of this essay was a signatory to this brief filed in 
Goodridge. 
 80. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 958.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 966. 
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woman’s legal identity all but evaporated into that of her 
husband. . . . But since at least the middle of the Nineteenth 
Century, both the courts and the legislature have acted to 
ameliorate the harshness of the common law regime. . . . 
Alarms over the imminent erosion of the “natural” order of 
marriage were sounded over the demise of antimiscegenation 
laws, the expansion of the rights of married women, and the 
introduction of “no fault” divorce. Marriage has survived all of 
these transformations, and we have no doubt that marriage will 
continue to be a vibrant and revered institution.83 
In this passage, Marshall not only analogizes to prior forms of 
discriminatory marriage laws to situate the present challenge by 
same-sex couples, but also concludes that marriage as an 
institution has survived seeming challenges to the “natural” order 
of things and predicts that it will continue to do so.84 
Finally, Marshall adopts a moral reading in declaring that the 
Court has authority to provide a remedy by “constru[ing] civil 
marriage to mean the voluntary union of two persons as spouses, 
to the exclusion of all others.”85 She explains that such a remedy 
is “entirely consonant with established principles of jurisprudence 
empowering a court to refine a common-law principle in light of 
evolving constitutional standards.”86 Concurring Justice Greaney 
expressly rejects an “original intent” approach to constitutional 
interpretation, indicating that “the provisions of our Constitution 
are, and must be, adaptable to changing circumstances and new 
social phenomena.”87 
III. “MORAL READINGS VERSUS ORIGINALISMS” IN 
OBERGEFELL 
In the wake of the circuit split created by DeBoer, and the 
Supreme Court granting certiorari, amici filed a record number of 
amicus curiae briefs.88 These set forth many constitutional 
 
 83. Id. at 966–67. 
 84. Id. at 967. Concurring Justice Greaney invoked these changes in marriage law in 
making a sex discrimination argument against the one man-one woman definition. Id. at 
970-74 (Greaney, J., concurring). 
 85. Id. at 969. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id. at 974 n.6 (Greaney, J., concurring) (disagreeing with dissenting Justice 
Cordy’s argument that because “the people,” when they revised the Massachusetts 
Constitution in 1976, did not intend it to be “relied upon to approve same-sex marriage,” 
it cannot now be used to reach that result). 
 88. See Liptak, supra note 5 (147 briefs). 
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pathways for reversing or affirming the Sixth Circuit. Most 
pertinent for this essay are (1) those briefs filed by legal scholars 
enlisting originalism either to strike down or uphold the 
restrictive state marriage laws and (2) those filed by historians to 
delineate the history of marriage and of the treatment of LGBT 
persons in the United States. 
In this Part, I first discuss various new originalist arguments 
made in Obergefell and challenged by other originalist scholars. I 
point out that the Obergefell dissenters hued closer to what 
Fleming would call conventional forms of originalism than the 
new originalism, similar to that of Judge Sutton in DeBoer. I then 
argue that Justice Kennedy’s majority in Obergefell is more 
compatible with a moral reading than with an originalist one in its 
focus on the dual evolution of understanding constitutional 
principles and of the institution of marriage. Notably, while 
Kennedy did not enlist the new originalist briefs or arguments, he 
did draw upon the briefs filed by historians and historians of 
marriage in his discussion of the relevance of history. 
A. COMPETING VISIONS OF ORIGINALISM 
The Cato Institute, along with William Eskridge Jr., Steven 
Calabresi, and several other legal scholars, filed an amicus brief 
arguing that the DeBoer majority opinion “erred by focusing on a 
certain kind of original understanding” of the Equal Protection 
Clause—“the immediate effect supporters ‘understood’ the 
Fourteenth Amendment to have”—rather than on “original 
meaning.”89 Amici contended that the latter approach is that 
taken by the Supreme Court, under which it “has asked how the 
well-established meaning of terminology added to the 
Constitution in 1868 applies to modern exclusion of new as well 
as established social groups.”90 On this approach, it would not be 
 
 89. Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 3. One signatory to the brief, William 
Eskridge, is a pioneer in the field of sexual orientation and the law and an advocate of 
dynamic statutory interpretation, perhaps making his turn to originalism surprising. Ilya 
Somin, a signatory on a different amicus brief enlisting originalism (The Legal Scholars 
Brief, supra note 15, discussed infra), observes that while “Eskridge himself is not an 
originalist—at least not in the sense of believing that originalism generally trumps other 
modes of constitutional interpretation, . . . as Michael Ramsey notes, ‘[i]t says something 
about originalism’s new place that the most prominent academic defender of same sex 
marriage makes the text’s original meaning the centerpiece of his argument.’” Somin, 
supra note 28, at 1-2.  
 90. Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 3 (citing VMI; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620 (1996)). 
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controlling that “there is no evidence that ‘the people who 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment understood it to require the 
States to change the definition of marriage.’”91 The Cato Institute 
Brief argues that the “original meaning” of the Equal Protection 
Clause is “the protection of equal laws,” and that it “prohibits 
caste legislation that discriminates against a social class, ‘not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to 
everyone else.’”92 While “original understanding” will not suffice 
to justify certain Equal Protection precedents, this original 
meaning approach can do so. 
The Cato Institute Brief articulates one form of what 
Fleming would call “new originalism”: it contends that “original-
meaning originalism ‘is entirely consistent with updating the 
application of its fixed principles in light of new factual 
information. Indeed, such updating is often not only permitted, 
but actually required by the theory.’”93 On this approach, while 
there was “no class of ‘gay people’ who could be targets of a caste 
regime” in 1868, a legal regime subsequently developed that 
“defined ‘homosexuals’ as a pariah class outside the general 
benefits and protections of the laws”;94 recently enacted state 
defense of marriage statutes and constitutional amendments 
“expanded” this caste regime.95 Seen in this light, then, 
“updating” involves recognizing that “distinctions between 
opposite-sex and same-sex couples do not serve any legitimate 
interest and are instead founded on the core stereotypes that have 
underwritten the past century’s anti-gay legislation.”96 
The second brief that enlisted a form of new originalism to 
challenge restrictive state marriage laws was filed by Andrew 
Koppelman and several other legal scholars. It makes a sex 
discrimination argument: laws forbidding same-sex couples to 
marry classify on the basis of sex and often rest on impermissible 
gender stereotypes and, thus, require intermediate scrutiny.97 As 
 
 91. Id. at 2–3 (quoting DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 403 (6th Cir. 2014)). 
 92. Id. at 3 (citing Romer, 517 U.S. at 635). 
 93. Id. at 4 (citing Somin, supra note 28). 
 94. Id. at 18. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 24–25. 
 97. Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15. Koppelman, one author on the brief, is 
known for advancing the argument that discrimination against gay men and lesbians 
(including restrictions on the right to marry) is sex discrimination; like Eskridge, he is not 
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discussed in Part II, Judge Berzon’s Latta concurrence and some 
other judicial opinions make this argument. What this brief adds 
is the contention that “laws restricting the right to marry on the 
basis of gender go against . . . the original meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”98 As does the Cato Institute, this 
second brief criticizes Judge Sutton’s claim that those laws “are 
consistent with the original meaning, because few if any observers 
in 1868 would have thought otherwise.”99 They counter that “as 
most originalists recognize today, the original expected 
applications of the framers are distinct from the original 
understanding of the meaning of the text. Only the latter is 
controlling law.”100 This form of originalism, to use Fleming’s 
framework, seems to be “abstract originalism” in that it 
recognizes that “[m]any important provisions of the Constitution 
establish broad, general principles that must be applied to factual 
conditions that can change over time.”101 However, it is not the 
principles that seem to evolve, but “our understanding of the 
relevant facts . . . as new evidence accumulates.”102 It is “changes 
in factual understanding” from 1868 to the present that support 
an argument, today, that restrictive marriage laws are a prohibited 
form of sex discrimination; for in 1868, “the drafters and ratifiers 
of the [14th] amendment believed that many forms of sex 
discrimination were compatible with the Amendment’s general 
ban on ‘class’ and ‘caste’ discrimination.”103 Indeed, the Legal 
Scholars Brief chronicles the long history of appeals to “natural” 
differences between men and women to justify laws that 
discriminated on the basis of gender, including laws about gender 
roles within marriage.104 Such would be the assumptions of “most 
Americans in 1868.”105 The authors draw parallels between 
present-day recognition of the unsoundness of nineteenth century 
 
generally viewed as an originalist. See Andrew Koppleman, Why Discrimination Against 
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994).  
 98. Legal Scholars Brief, supra note 15, at 23-24. 
 99. Id. at 24.  
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 25. The authors give the example of Robert Bork’s account of why the 
Court in Brown v. Board of Education was justified because “[b]y 1954 . . . it had been 
apparent for some time that segregation rarely if ever produced equality.” Id. (quoting 
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82 (1990)). 
 104. Id. at 26–27. 
 105. Id. at 27. 
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assumptions about gender roles within marriage and 
“overwhelming evidence” today indicating that “same-sex 
marriages are capable of carrying out the major social purposes of 
opposite-sex marriage, including raising children and 
strengthening social ties.”106 
Obliquely addressing a question posed two years earlier by 
Justice Scalia in the oral argument over the constitutional 
challenge to Proposition 8—about the date on which laws banning 
same-sex marriage became unconstitutional—the brief contends: 
“In order to justify striking down laws banning same-sex 
marriage, we need not identify exactly when the accumulation of 
evidence became great enough to be decisive, only that it reached 
that point at some time before the present case came before the 
court.”107 
Both of these briefs reject the narrow “original meaning” 
approach adopted by the Sixth Circuit in favor of what Fleming 
might call “abstract originalism,” which is more like a moral 
reading than conventional originalism. These brief authors might 
resist his argument that they are engaging in a moral reading 
because they insist that the moving parts are not evolution in 
understanding of principles of equality or liberty, but evolution in 
understanding of facts and the application of those principles to 
facts. Is this a distinction with a difference? Certainly, evaluating 
those facts requires some exercise of moral and political 
judgment. On this question of the boundaries of originalism, two 
observations based on the Obergefell record may be helpful. First, 
it is telling that some originalist legal scholars (including 
Lawrence Alexander and Steven D. Smith), along with the 
Marriage Law Foundation, filed an amicus brief specifically 
challenging the Cato Institute’s account of “original meaning” and 
contending that the Cato Institute Brief’s approach was more akin 
to that of Ronald Dworkin, a “sophisticated critic of originalist 
constitutionalism.”108 Indeed, Fleming views Dworkin as a leading 
exemplar of a moral reading approach (pp. 11, 73-74); the 
Scholars of Originalism Brief characterizes Dworkin’s approach 
 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id. at 27–28 (citing Ilya Somin, How to Figure Out When Laws Banning Same-
Sex Marriage Became Unconstitutional, and Why the Precise Date May Not Matter, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 26, 2013, 11:44 PM), http://volokh.com/2-13/03/26/how-to-
figure-out-when-laws-banning-same-sex-marriage-became-unconstitutional-and-why-the-
precise-date-may-not-matter/). 
 108. Scholars of Originalism Brief, supra note 16, at 15.  
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as one where “judges should enforce the general ‘concepts’ 
reflected in the Constitution, not the specific ‘conceptions’ 
contemplated by the enactors.”109 While Dworkin and similar 
critics of originalism specifically acknowledged that “they were 
opposing historical meaning as an authoritative criterion,” the 
Cato Brief exemplifies a tack of making “prodigious use of the 
‘abstraction’ strategy, while continuing to claim the label of 
‘originalism.’”110 Indeed, the Scholars of Originalism Brief asserts 
that while there may be “definite advantages, at least within the 
academy, in turning ‘originalism’ into a big tent that can include 
almost anyone,” such as “dispel[ling] some of the hostility that 
originalism has sometimes provoked,” “if ‘original meaning’ is 
defined so loosely that virtually everyone and every decision can 
be classed as ‘originalist,’ the term ceases to have any real 
meaning at all.”111 (These criticisms echo those Fleming makes of 
Baude’s “inclusive originalism.” (pp. 15-19)) Finally, the authors 
proffer their most serious objection to this “theoretical 
conception of ‘original meaning’ that is highly abstract and 
separated from the ‘understanding’ of constitutional enactors and 
ratifiers”: 
[it] defeats the goal of permitting “We the People,” acting 
through our elected representatives in Congress and the state 
legislatures, to deliberate intelligently and understandingly 
about proposed constitutional measures, and then to decide 
whether or not to entrench those measures in our 
constitutional law.112 
Second, none of the conservative members of the Court—all 
of whom dissented in Obergefell—accepted these newer 
approaches to original meaning. Instead, they hued closer to the 
approach taken by Judge Sutton. Justice Scalia insisted that “the 
People’s understanding”—“when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was ratified in 1868”—that states did and could (constitutionally) 
limit marriage to one man and one woman “resolves these 
cases.”113 As Cott observes, “more than one version of the history 
of marriage [was] operating” in Obergefell.114 Chief Justice 
Roberts viewed marriage as an “unvarying social institution.” He 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 15–16. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2628 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 114. Cott, supra note 7, at 1. 
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asserted that the “singular understanding of marriage”—as the 
union of one man and one woman—“has prevailed in the United 
States throughout our history,” so that “to those who drafted and 
ratified the Constitution, this conception of marriage and family 
‘was a given. . . .’”115 Further, because “the Constitution itself says 
nothing about marriage . . . the Framers . . . entrusted” the subject 
of domestic relations—including the definition of marriage—to 
the states.116 Affirmatively citing DeBoer, Roberts observes that, 
before and after statehood, the four states whose laws are under 
challenge “defined marriage in the traditional, biologically rooted 
way.”117 Like Sutton, Roberts endorses the responsible 
procreation rationale for this definition of marriage.118 Roberts 
concurs with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that, rather than 
“‘constitutionalizing the definition of marriage,’” it should be left 
in “the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state 
voters.”119 Justice Alito argues similarly, charging the majority 
with giving a “distinctively postmodern meaning” to Due Process 
“liberty.”120 Finally, Justice Thomas appeals to how “the Framers” 
understood “liberty” to argue that the Court is “deviating from 
the original meaning” of the Due Process Clauses.121 
It is clear, thus, that none of the conservative justices found 
the new originalism persuasive. What about Justice Kennedy, who 
everyone assumed would be the decisive vote one way or the 
other? To the extent that amici pitched their new originalist 
arguments to “an audience of one,”122 it is telling that while Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion repeatedly referred to the “meaning” of 
marriage as well as of liberty and equality, he emphasized 
evolving meaning, not “original meaning.” Further, he did not 
follow the route of deploying “original meaning” to hold the state 
laws unconstitutional as sex discrimination or (explicitly) as 
 
 115. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 2614. 
 118. Id.; see supra Part II.A for discussion of this argument.  
 119. Id. at 2615. 
 120. Id. at 2640; see also id. at 2642 (because “the Constitution simply does not speak 
to the issue of same-sex marriage” by including a “right to marry a person of the same sex,” 
it falls to “the people,” not the Court, to “control their destiny” and decide on whether to 
fundamentally change the definition of marriage). 
 121. Id. at 2632–34 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 122. Cf. Susan R. Estrich and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Abortion Politics: Writing for an 
Audience of One 138 U. PENN. L. REV. 119 (1989) (making argument for women’s 
reproductive rights aimed at Justice O’Connor). 
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impermissible class discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.123 More obviously influential on Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion than the new originalist briefs discussed above were briefs 
filed by historians that informed his account of these forms of 
evolution. As Nancy Cott (coauthor of an influential amicus brief 
and a frequent expert in marriage litigation) observed, “history 
really matter[ed]” in Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority 
opinion, specifically, the history of the institution of marriage and 
how it has “changed over time to admit new understandings of 
liberty and equality” as well as “the history of condemnation and 
criminalization of same-sex intimacy until recent decades.”124 
Kennedy enlisted this history, I will argue, in service of a moral 
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
B. THE OBERGEFELL MAJORITY OPINION: DUAL FORMS OF 
EVOLVING UNDERSTANDING 
Justice Kennedy’s landmark majority opinion in Obergefell 
crucially deployed two forms of evolving understanding—of 
constitutional guarantees of equality and the “promise of liberty” 
as well as of the institution of marriage. Those two forms of 
evolution worked together in his opinion to reject a static notion 
either of the fundamental right to marry or of marriage itself. 
They both undergird the holding that same-sex couples may 
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states. They reflect 
a moral reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
With respect to the evolving understanding of the 
Constitution’s “promise” of liberty, Kennedy opens the 
Obergefell opinion with the declaration that: “The Constitution 
promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes 
certain specific rights that allow persons within a lawful realm, to 
define and express their identity.”125 This language closely 
parallels the opening passage of Lawrence v. Texas: “[l]iberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, 
belief, expression, and certain intimate conduct.”126 Similarly, the 
joint opinion in Planned Parenthood v. Casey declared: “It is a 
 
 123. Notably, an author on the Cato Institute Brief acknowledges that Justice 
Kennedy did not adopt various originalist arguments. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The 
Marriage Equaltiy Cases and Constitutional Theory, 2015 CATO. SUP. CT. REV. 111. 
 124. Cott, supra note 7.  
 125. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2593. 
 126. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
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promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal 
liberty which the government may not enter.”127 
“Insight,” or evolving understanding, plays a critical role in 
Lawrence, for example, about fulfilling “the promise of liberty.” 
Lawrence ends with the often-quoted passage that the ratifiers of 
the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments did not “presume” to have the “insight” to map 
specifically all the components of liberty, but instead “knew times 
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that 
laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to 
oppress.”128 Because of this temporal dimension to understanding 
constitutional principles, Kennedy adds: “As the Constitution 
endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in 
their own search for greater freedom.”129 The joint opinion in 
Casey made a similar statement about the Constitution as “a 
covenant running from the first generation of Americans to us and 
then to future generations” and that “[e]ach generation must 
learn anew that the Constitution’s written terms embody ideas 
and aspirations that must survive more ages than one.”130 In 
Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, Fleming points to both of 
these opinions—and these passages—as exemplifying a moral 
reading (pp. 58, 191). 
Obergefell builds on this idea by observing that: “[t]he nature 
of injustice is that we may not see it in our own times.”131 Thus, as 
“new insight” reveals “discord” between the Constitution’s 
“central protections” and “a received legal stricture,” claims of 
liberty “must be addressed.”132 New insights about constitutional 
guarantees intersect with new insights about marriage as new 
generations help to reveal that what once seemed “natural and 
just”—defining marriage only as the union of one man and one 
woman—now is an injustice that is “inconsisten[t] with the central 
meaning of the fundamental right to marry.”133 This view of 
marriage stands in sharp contrast with that offered in the several 
dissents, which argue for the unchanging, universal definition and 
purpose of marriage. In Windsor, just two years earlier, Justice 
 
 127. 505 U.S. 833, 844, 847 (1992). 
 128. 539 U.S. at 578–79. 
 129. Id. at 579. 
 130. Casey, 505 U.S. at 901. 
 131. 135 S. Ct. at 2598. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 2602. 
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Kennedy observed that New York’s citizens and elected 
representatives, in enacting a law allowing same-sex couples to 
marry, acted to “correct” what they now perceived “to be an 
injustice that they had not earlier known or understood.”134 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion closely resembles the opinion in 
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, in which the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts stated that marriage is an 
“evolving paradigm”—rather than static.135 Moreover, Kennedy, 
like the Goodridge court, goes further in contending that “new 
insights” have spurred “deep transformations” that have 
“strengthened, not weakened, the institution of marriage.”136 In 
canvassing these transformations, Kennedy cites to the amicus 
brief filed by the Historians of Marriage and the American 
Historical Association,137 which challenged the Sixth Circuit’s 
argument that correcting any injustices in that law should be left 
to the democratic process as community mores evolve. That brief 
contends that: “[J]udicial review has often led to the recognition 
that traditional or discriminatory views of marriage (and 
marriage-related laws) must give way in the face of evolving 
understandings of race and gender embodied in constitutional 
guarantees under the Fourteenth Amendment.”138 
Countering the Sixth Circuit’s assertion of a universal 
definition of marriage and marriage’s origin in channelling 
procreation, the Marriage Historians Brief chronicles the 
“multiple” political, social, economic, legal, and personal 
purposes served by marriage as a civil institution “[o]ver this 
Nation’s history” since the founding.139 The brief also charts the 
evolution of the laws governing marriage as the Nation has 
recognized the injustice of restricting some citizens from 
exercising the right to marry.140 While Judge Sutton rooted 
marriage’s origin in laws of nature, the Marriage Historians Brief 
points out how opponents of the demise of coverture attacked its 
dismantling as “blasphemous and unnatural,” contrary to Divine 
 
 134. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013). 
 135. 798 N.E.2d 941, 966–67 (Mass. 2003). 
 136. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 137. Brief of Historians of Marriage and the American Historical Association as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 
14-556, -562, -571, and -574) [hereinafter Marriage Historians Brief]. 
 138. Id. at 22. 
 139. Id. at 6–7.  
 140. Id. at 6. 
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will;141 opponents of the striking down of antimiscegenation laws 
later warned that “permitting cross-racial couples to marry would 
fatally degrade the institution of marriage,” on the premise that 
“marriages across the color line were against nature, and against 
the Divine plan (as some opponents argue today against same-sex 
marriage).”142 
While the dissents emphasize the determinative role of 
history and tradition, Kennedy takes a more critical approach to 
history. While conceding that the historical understanding of 
marriage was a union between one man and one woman, he 
rejects the respondent states’ argument that history is not only 
“the beginning of these cases,” but also “should be the end as 
well.”143 Instead, he observes: “The history of marriage is one of 
both continuity and change.”144 
In explaining how new insights about the injustice within 
basic institutions such as marriage are gained, Kennedy again 
sounds the theme of generational moral progress: “changed 
understandings of marriage are characteristic of a Nation where 
new dimensions of freedom become apparent to new 
generations.”145 Further, social movements seeking change play a 
role, since these new understandings often become apparent 
“through perspectives that begin in pleas or protests and then are 
considered in the political sphere and the judicial process.”146 
Kennedy’s view of the relationship between democracy and 
constitutionalism differs notably from Judge Sutton’s and from 
the Obergefell dissents. 
What new insights about marriage inform the majority’s 
holding that same-sex couples may exercise the fundamental right 
to marry? One source of insight is the substantial body of case law 
growing out of challenges by same-sex couples to state marriage 
laws and to the federal DOMA, beginning back in the 1990s in 
Hawaii and proliferating post-Windsor. Kennedy says that case 
law has helped to “explain and formulate the underlying 
 
 141. Id. at 18. 
 142. Id. at 21. 
 143. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at 2596. 
 146. Id.  
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principles” about the right to marry that the Court concludes 
apply equally to same-sex and opposite-sex couples.147 
Another significant “new insight” involving “changing 
understandings” arising out of social movements and “pleas and 
protests” is not about marriage as such, but about the capacity of 
gay men and lesbians to enter into it. To chronicle this “dynamic,” 
Kennedy draws on another historical brief, filed by the 
Organization of American Historians.148 That history includes 
long moral condemnation of “same-sex intimacy,” a 
condemnation expressed in the criminal law (upheld in Bowers v. 
Hardwick but eventually struck down in Lawrence).149 Kennedy 
observes that the Supreme Court, “like many institutions,” made 
“assumptions defined by the world and time of which it is a part,” 
thus issuing a one sentence summary affirmance (in 1972) in one 
of the earliest challenges by a same-sex couple to state marriage 
laws, Baker v. Nelson, which Obergefell overrules.150 That history 
also includes a failure to appreciate the dignitary claims of gays 
and lesbians and, prior to 1973, a labeling of their sexual 
orientation as a mental disorder rather than as a “normal 
expression of human sexuality and immutable.”151 
Three prior Kennedy opinions—Romer, Lawrence, and 
Windsor—all were turning points in marking this new insight; 
those opinions have characteristic vocabulary of concern for 
dignity and respect and not demeaning the existence of gay men 
and lesbians. Windsor shifts the focus to the dignity and respect 
conferred by the bond of marriage itself upon same-sex couples 
and the message of inequality sent by DOMA when it fails to 
recognize their marriages. Windsor involved a two-step process: 
(1) Lawrence declaring that the intimate lives of same-sex couples 
were worthy of dignity and respect; and (2) the state of New York 
conferring dignity and respect and community stature through 
allowing such couples to marry.152 By contrast, Obergefell holds 
that those couples may exercise that right pursuant to the Federal 
 
 147. Id. at 2597. 
 148. Brief of the Organization of American Historians as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -574). 
 149. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2596 (citing Organization of American Historians Brief, 
supra note 136, 5-28). 
 150. Id. at 2598. 
 151. Id. at 2596. 
 152. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2677, 2694 (2013). 
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Constitution itself, in light of evolving understandings both of 
constitutional freedom and of marriage. 
Two other new insights about marriage warrant mention 
because they contribute to the majority’s conclusion that deep 
transformations in marriage actually strengthen the institution: 
the demise of laws barring interracial marriage and the 
repudiation of gender hierarchy in marriage. As discussed in Part 
II, these two transformations feature prominently in prior 
marriage equality jurisprudence, as evidenced in the DeBoer 
dissent and the Goodridge majority. Kennedy relates these 
insights to the intertwining of Due Process and Equal Protection 
in understanding the scope of the right to marry. The intertwining 
or “synergy” between these two clauses is another characteristic 
theme in Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence.153 He invokes Loving 
v. Virginia to illustrate the “interrelation” of the independent 
principles of each Clause. The Court’s invalidation of racial 
restrictions on who may marry drew on both Equal Protection and 
Due Process. While conventional understandings of Loving have 
emphasized its equal protection holding, Justice Kennedy argues 
that looking at liberty and equality together helped to make “the 
reasons why marriage is a fundamental right bec[o]me more clear 
and compelling.”154 Notably, Kennedy refers to this 
understanding as coming from a “full awareness and 
understanding of the hurt that resulted” from such laws.155 Hurt 
and humiliation, of course, was a large theme in Windsor and in 
numerous post-Windsor federal opinions; it is not a prominent 
theme in the economically written Loving opinion itself.156 
In a passage that may reflect the influence of Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, Justice Kennedy offers his second example of 
how interpreting the Equal Protection Clause can lead the Court 
to recognize “that new insights and societal understandings can 
reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental 
 
 153. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. Similarly, in Goodridge, Chief Justice Marshall—
citing Perez and Lawrence—observed that, “in matters implicating marriage, family life, 
and the upbringing of children, the two constitutional concepts [of liberty and equality] 
frequently overlap as they do here.” 798 N.E.2d at 953. 
 154. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.  
 155. Id.  
 156. In her dissent in DeBoer, Judge Daughtrey led with the majority’s disturbing lack 
of attention to the “actual plaintiffs as persons, suffering actual harm,” as well as the impact 
of the restrictive laws upon their children, drawing on the extensive trial record about the 
capacity of gay and lesbian parents to rear children. 772 F.3d at 421–28.  
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institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”157 
That example is that, even in the 1970s and 1980s, “invidious sex-
based classifications in marriage remained common”; such laws 
“denied the equal dignity of men and women.” The Court, 
“responding to a new awareness,” used equal protection 
principles “to invalidate laws imposing sex-based inequality on 
marriage.”158 
Kennedy, thus, observes that the Court has “correct[ed] 
inequalities” based on race and sex within the institution of 
marriage, thus vindicating “precepts of liberty and equality.”159 
His opinion also notes the intertwining of liberty and equality in 
Lawrence and then asserts that the same dynamic applies to same-
sex marriage. The significance of evolving understanding is 
evident when the Court states: “It is now clear that the challenged 
laws burden the liberty of same-sex couples . . . and . . . abridge 
central precepts of equality.”160 Significant themes about denial of 
liberty and equality join together here: against a “long history of 
disapproval of their relationships”—recall the constitutional 
limits in liberty and equality cases on singling out a group based 
on moral disapproval—this denial of the right to marry “works a 
grave and continuing harm.”161 The denial imposes a “disability” 
on them that “serves to disrespect and subordinate them.”162 
Although Romer is not cited here, that opinion noted the 
disability imposed by Amendment 2 forbidding protection against 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or conduct.163 To 
be sure, new originalists might well argue that the majority’s use 
of the language of imposing a “disability” upon a class that is 
singled out is consistent with the “original meaning” of the 
Fourteenth Amendment as anti-class legislation.164 I believe, 
though, that the role of evolving understanding of the meaning of 
constitutional guarantees, so prevalent in Kennedy’s opinion, 
signals a moral reading. For instance, Kennedy states: 
 
 157. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603. 
 158. Id. at 2604. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id. 
 163. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
 164. See Cato Institute Brief, supra note 15, at 17–24 (arguing that restrictive state 
marriage laws expand an “anti-gay caste regime”). 
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The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long 
have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the 
central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now 
manifest. With that knowledge must come the recognition that 
laws excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right 
impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic 
charter.165 
While new factual understandings play a role, normative 
judgments about justice and about rights also evolve. 
By contrast to Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the evolution 
of the institution of marriage to correct injustices within it, Chief 
Justice Roberts rejects the idea that these were “fundamental” 
transformations. On his view, the fundamental (essential) 
character of marriage through all these changes was as a one man-
one woman institution. This minimizing strategy is unpersuasive. 
Defenders of bans on interracial marriage stressed marriage’s link 
to procreation; preventing mixed-race offspring was a central 
rationale offered for those laws.166 Further, the Marriage 
Historians Brief and other briefs emphasized some of the 
similarity in arguments made in defense of these laws and of bans 
on same-sex marriage.167 
Roberts is also unpersuasive when he asserts that if you asked 
a person on the street, while state marriage law embraced the 
common law’s model of gender hierarchy, they would never had 
defined marriage as “the union of a man and a woman, where the 
woman is subject to coverture.”168 They may well not have used 
the term “coverture,” but many likely would have had an 
everyday understanding of marriage as a domestic relation in 
which husband and wife occupied distinct, and complementary 
gender roles, with the husband as the head of the household and 
representative of the family in public life, and the wife as subject 
to and properly dependent upon her husband. Civil marriage, as 
the Marriage Historians Brief explains, developed in Western 
political culture as closely related to governance, in particular, 
 
 165. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602 (emphasis added).  
 166. See generally PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY (2009). 
 167. Marriage Historians Brief, supra note 137, at 22–23. See Brief Amicus Curiae of 
Carlos A. Ball et al. in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) 
(Nos. 14-556, -562, -571, -574) (drawing parallels between “pseudoscientific” and 
“pseudoempirical” justifications offered for antimiscegenation laws and opposition to 
same-sex marriage).  
 168. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2614. 
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with male heads of households as “delegates” for those within the 
household.169 
C. A ROAD NOT TAKEN: SEX DISCRIMINATION 
Kennedy declined to make a full-blown sex discrimination 
argument for striking down state marriage laws limiting marriage 
to one man and one woman, although such an argument was 
among those advanced by the petitioners and a number of amici. 
If Justice Ginsburg had written a concurring opinion that (similar 
to Judge Berzon) elaborated that sex discrimination rationale, the 
Court’s new Equal Protection jurisprudence and corresponding 
changes in family law would likely have been central components. 
While, as noted above, the Legal Scholars Brief offered this 
argument as consistent with “original meaning” of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, I would argue that any such Ginsburg opinion 
would likely have evidence of a moral reading. Fleming argues, 
for example, that Ginsburg, like Justice Brennan, is a moral 
reader who believes that “the point of adopting and amending the 
Constitution is not to embody longstanding historical practices 
but to transform them in pursuit of our constitutional aspirations 
to normative principles like liberty equality and liberty” (p. 44). 
Ginsburg long ago called for “boldly dynamic interpretation,” 
rather than an “original understanding” approach to change the 
long history of “empty-cupboard” jurisprudence with respect to 
sex equality.170 Ginsburg, like Justice O’Connor before her, has 
given her share of speeches pointing out some of the “greatest 
hits” (or, I suppose, “greatest misses”) in the Court’s long history 
of failing to treat women as equals to men and its upholding of 
aspects of the law of coverture and of separate spheres ideology.171 
While some prominent feminist constitutional scholars support 
sex discrimination as a constitutional hook for striking down the 
one man-one woman definition of marriage,172 they do so not by 
appealing to “original understanding” or “original public 
meaning” either of marriage or of equality. The dissenting 
 
 169. Marriage Historians Brief, supra note 137, at 7. 
 170. See Ginsburg, supra note 20 and accompanying text; see also Case, supra note 23. 
 171. The concurring opinion by Justice Bradley in Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 
(1873), is a standard text in such presentations of the history of the Court’s treatment of 
women’s status under the Constitution. As noted in text, it is similarly cited in Planned 
Parenthood v. Casey. 
 172. Case, supra note 23. 
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opinion by Judge Daughtrey, as well as the underlying concurring 
opinion by Judge Berzon, discussed in Part II are instructive. 
D. THE FOUR PRINCIPLES AND REASONED JUDGMENT 
Finally, Justice Kennedy’s method of identifying four 
principles underlying the reason that the right to marry is 
fundamental also evidence a moral reading. In looking to such 
principles the majority rejects Glucksberg, which defined 
“liberty” in a “circumscribed” manner, by reference to “specific 
historical practices.”173 Kennedy counters that such an approach 
is inconsistent with the approach used when fundamental rights 
are at stake, such as the right to marry.174 Kennedy cites Loving 
and Lawrence to elaborate on the limits of historical practices: “If 
rights were defined by who exercised them in the past, then 
received practices could serve as their own continued justification 
and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”175 Kennedy 
further invokes Justice Harlan’s method of reasoned judgment 
and rejects the reduction of Due Process to a narrow formula. 
“History and tradition guide and discipline this inquiry [of 
identifying fundamental rights], but do not set its outer 
boundaries.”176 
The majority identifies four “underlying principles” that 
demonstrate that “the reasons marriage is fundamental under the 
Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.”177 
These principles about marriage stress both goods and rights; that 
marriage simultaneously has public and private dimensions.178 So, 
too, Justice Kennedy affirms—as one principle—that marriage is 
an institution “at the center” of “many facets of the legal and 
social order”—a “keystone of our social order.” Its very centrality 
makes exclusion from it all the more unjust and, to use another 
term favored by Kennedy, “urgent.”179 Taking a page from 
 
 173. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
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 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 2598. 
 177. Id. at 2599. 
 178. In other work, James Fleming and I point out the dual focus on rights (to 
autonomy and self-definition) and moral goods in Goodridge and in the California 
marriage case, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008). See JAMES E. FLEMING AND 
LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 
(2013). 
 179.  Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
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Goodridge, Justice Kennedy stresses that prior transformations of 
marriage in response to newly-perceived injustices have 
strengthened, not weakened it. He concludes that respondents 
have not shown a foundation for concluding that allowing same-
sex marriage will cause the harmful outcomes they predict; while 
he does not explicitly predict the institution will thrive with this 
new step, he certainly, in an allusion to Lawrence, makes clear 
that these new marriages “pose no risk of harm,” including to 
third parties.180 This discussion of what marriage is and what its 
purposes are contrasts sharply with the more truncated view 
offered in Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent (and in the Sixth Circuit 
majority opinion). The Obergefell majority observes that, as 
marriage has evolved over time, so too have understandings of its 
purposes. Kennedy’s elaboration of the four principles 
emphasizes rights and their gradual extension to those previously 
excluded, another way in which he offers a moral reading of the 
Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
To return to my opening questions: what’s in a name? Why 
do definitions matter? At issue in this symposium are the 
boundaries of competing approaches to constitutional 
interpretation and what the respective promise of moral readings 
and originalisms are for controversies like this marriage definition 
battle. One aim of Fleming’s book is to point out that new 
originalists are moving in directions that seem to embrace 
methods that old (and some new) originalists condemned—when 
practiced by moral readers—as out of bounds (pp. 3-19). The 
move to “original meaning” or “original public meaning,” for 
example, seeks to free interpreters from being bound by historical 
applications that were based on factual assumptions that later 
generations (and even some at the time) rightly view as incorrect. 
Certainly, feminists are acutely familiar with wrong-headed 
assumptions about women’s capacities and roles and the way in 
which those assumptions have rationalized their inequality, over 
time, in the economic, familial, political, and legal spheres. Thus, 
it is certainly intriguing and worth noting when prominent 
originalist theorists wish to champion prohibiting sex 
discrimination as a proper aim of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
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even if that aim was realized tardily. So, too, it was intriguing, as 
the Court considered Obergefell, to learn of the attempts by some 
originalists to make a constitutional “case” for same-sex marriage 
as flowing from the Fourteenth Amendment’s original meaning 
prohibiting class or caste legislation. I shall not “rule” on whether 
these developments fit comfortably within a “big tent” 
originalism181 or whether, as Fleming would likely argue, they are 
better seen as the incorporation of moral reading methods, such 
that these originalists should “reconceive their projects as being 
in support of the moral reading”—rather than as “offering 
alternatives to it”—and join the moral reading big tent (p. 97). As 
Fleming observes, while “there is no hope” of reconciling old 
originalism—of the sort evident in Judge Sutton’s opinion and 
some of the Obergefell dissents—with moral reading, the 
“prospects for reconciliation” of new originalism and moral 
readings are more promising (pp. 48-49). These arguments about 
new appreciation of the proper application of constitutional 
principles as new understandings dawn bring to mind the theme 
of generational and moral progress sounded at the end of 
Lawrence v. Texas and echoed in a number of post-Windsor 
opinions: “As the Constitution endures persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.”182 Fittingly, Fleming closes his book with this passage, 
urging citizens, scholars, and judges to be moral readers who are 
mindful that the Constitution establishes a “framework for a self-
governing people to build out over time in light of experience 
together with moral and political learning” (p. 191). 
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